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(88) 
SHORTSIGHTED RESPONSE TO REVERSE PAYMENTS: HOW THE 
THIRD CIRCUIT MAY CAUSE CONSUMERS TO “PAY FOR THE 
DELAY” OF NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT 
JUDE STEININGER* 
“The premise of laws against copying, however, is that humanity’s 
innate or socially determined desire to create is simply not enough in a 
modern innovation-based economy.  To have sustained innovation—
and to do so in areas that require significant investments of time and 
money—it is necessary to have a reliable expectation of economic 
reward.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Almost everyone, at some point in his or her life, has been affected by 
pharmaceutical innovation.2  Whether it was as minor as needing cough 
medicine from your local pharmacy or as severe as needing medications to 
survive an operation, nearly everyone can relate.3  Often, trivial sickness comes 
and goes without real consideration for the resources needed to create the 
prescription drugs necessary to cure the illness.4  Recently an issue has 
developed that has the capacity to affect our medical landscape and threaten 
drug innovation in the future.5 
 
*  Villanova University School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2014; Pennsylvania State 
University Smeal College of Business, B.S. Economics 2011.  I would like to thank my fellow 
editors on the Villanova Law Review for their helpful feedback throughout this process.  I 
would also like to thank my mother, Mary Beth Steininger, for her unwavering support 
throughout my academic career. 
1.  Chris Sprigman, Does Copying Kill Creativity?, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY BLOG (Sept. 
26, 2012), http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-knockoff-economy/201209/does-
copying-kill-creativity. 
2.  See JACK A. MEYER, ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: 
A COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK 8 (2002), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/7074694/Assessing-the-Impact-of-Pharmaceutical-Innovation-A-
Comprehensive-Framework (scanning wide variety of multiple health condition 
improvements that have resulted from pharmaceutical innovation).  Studies have shown that 
certain innovative drug developments have shown positive health benefits that coincide with a 
reduction in health costs.  See id. (asserting positive impact on health and economics provided 
through drug innovation). 
3.  See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, THERAPEUTIC DRUG USE 
(2011), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/drugs.htm (stating statistical data of therapeutic drug 
use from 2005–2008). 
4.  See Michael Dickson & Jean Paul Gagnon, The Cost of New Drug Development and 
Discovery, DISCOVERY MEDICINE (June 20, 2009), 
http://www.discoverymedicine.com/Michael-Dickson/2009/06/20/the-cost-of-new-drug-
discovery-and-development/ (discussing high costs involved with creating medications).  
Drug discovery and development usually costs the pharmaceutical companies hundreds of 
millions of dollars.  See id. (explaining incredibly high costs involved in drug innovation and 
development). 
5.  See Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped: What’s at Stake for Pharma and Consumers, 
MAKOVSKY INTEGRATED COMMUNICATIONS, 
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This issue derives from the 1984 legislation known as the Hatch-Waxman 
Act.6  Congress sought to create a mechanism that would allow for a greater 
influx of generic alternatives in the pharmaceutical marketplace.7  Through this 
legislation, generic manufacturers were provided an abbreviated application 
process for seeking Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of a 
bioequivalent alternative to a formerly patented drug.8 
In response to the ensuing challenges, branded pharmaceutical corporations 
sought out settlements that would help reinforce their exclusionary patent 
rights.9  The resulting agreements became known as pay-for-delay, or reverse 
payment settlements.10  Essentially, the generic challenger agrees to keep their 
generic alternative off the shelves in return for payments from the patent 
holder’s future profit margin.11  The resulting monopolistic effects have led to 
pharmaceutical wholesalers and retailers taking legal action.12  Claiming 
antitrust violations under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, these parties 
allege that reverse payment settlements cause an unreasonable restraint of trade 
in the pharmaceutical industry.13 
Over the past decade, multiple circuit courts have struggled to formulate a 
consistent method of examining these settlements.14  Recently a Third Circuit 
 
http://www.makovsky.com/insights/strategies/reverse-payments-ban-dropped (last visited Oct. 
10, 2012) [hereinafter Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped] (asserting strong concern for future 
pharmaceutical innovation).  
6.  See Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey Paul Jarosch, Policy Reversal on Reverse Payments: 
Why Courts Should Not Follow the New DOJ Position on Reverse-Payment Settlements of 
Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 96 IOWA L. REV. 57, 63 (2010) (explaining that reverse 
payment settlements occur in setting of Hatch-Waxman Act). 
7.  See Gregory Dolin, Reverse Settlements as Patent Invalidity Signals, 24 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 281, 283 (2011) (asserting first goal of Hatch-Waxman Act to be increasing amount 
of lower cost generic drugs available to general public). 
8.  See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 203 (3d Cir. 2012) (explaining short-
form application process offered to generic manufacturers through Hatch-Waxman Act). 
9.  See Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a 
Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1553 (2006) (asserting that in past 
decade pharmaceutical drug makers have turned to reverse payment settlements to end 
litigation in this area). 
10.  See Kendyl Hanks et al., “Pay-for-Delay” Settlements: Antitrust Violation or 
Proper Exercise of Pharmaceutical Patent Rights?, BUS. L. TODAY 1, 1–2 (2011), available 
at http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/content/2011/01/article-hanks.pdf (explaining that 
these settlements are known as reverse payment settlements or pay-for-delay settlements). 
11.  See Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate the Antitrust 
Laws?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489, 494–95 (explaining mechanics 
of reverse payment settlements); see also Steven W. Day, Leaving Room for Innovation: 
Rejecting the FTC’s Stance Against Reverse Payments in Schering-Plough v. FTC, 57 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 223, 230 (2006) (discussing payment from patentee to alleged infringer).  
12.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 208 (discussing private claim brought by wholesalers and 
retailers).  The plaintiffs stated, “On April 14, 2008, the Special Master certified a class of 
plaintiffs consisting of forty-four wholesalers and retailers who purchased K-Dur directly 
from Schering.”  Id.   
13.  See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 60 (asserting that claims brought against 
reverse payment settlements are alleged violations of Sherman Act).  The claims allege that 
the reverse payment settlements unreasonably restrain trade therefore violating section one of 
the Sherman Antitrust Act.  See id.  
14.  See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006); In re 
2
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decision has further substantiated an evident circuit split.15  The inconsistency 
in reverse payment analysis calls for Supreme Court intervention, and without 
the appropriate clarification, the pharmaceutical industry could suffer 
detrimental consequences.16 
Part II of this Note explains the legislation of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
(Act), its purpose, and the mechanics that led to the resulting reverse payment 
settlements.17  Part III surveys the landscape of prior case law throughout the 
circuit courts.18  Part IV discusses the recent Third Circuit decision in In re K-
Dur Antitrust Litigation that has rekindled the Hatch-Waxman debate.19  Part V 
analyzes the policy concerns advanced by opposing sides of the argument and 
the economic fallout likely to result.20  Finally, part VI concludes with the 
assertion that the Supreme Court must intervene and establish the most 
beneficial standard of analysis for reverse payment settlements.21 
II. THE HATCHING OF A PROBLEMATIC ACT 
The legislation of the Hatch-Waxman Act has sparked a heated debate in 
the pharmaceutical industry.22  Congress acted in an attempt to counter the high 
prices of pharmaceuticals, and their decision has further endangered medical 
consumers.23  A thorough examination of the motivations of the Act, the 
functionality of the Act, and the resulting litigation, leads to the logical 
conclusion that efficient and effective reform is essential.24 
 
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva 
Pharms. Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003); Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 
F.3d 799 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
15.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 197 (holding reverse payments to be prima facie evidence 
of illegality). 
16.  See Aaron Barkoff, Third Circuit Issues Landmark Decision in Reverse Payment 
Case, Setting Up Supreme Court Review, ORANGE BOOK BLOG (July 17, 2012), 
http://www.orangebookblog.com/2012/07/3rd-circuit-issues-landmark-decision-in-pay-for-
delay-case-setting-up-supreme-court-review.html (asserting likely Supreme Court intervention 
to resolve conflict); cf. Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (explaining detrimental 
effects that will likely result from banning reverse payment settlements). 
17.  For an examination of the legislation, purpose, and results of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, see infra notes 25–50 and accompanying text. 
18.  For an overview of previous case law developed in other circuit courts, see infra 
notes 51–71 and accompanying text. 
19.  For an examination of the recent Third Circuit opinion, see infra notes 72–118 and 
accompanying text. 
20.  For an analysis of the policy concerns advanced by different circuit courts and the 
economic consequences likely to result from each approach, see infra notes 119–210 and 
accompanying text. 
21.  For concluding remarks and a brief assertion of the analysis needed to derive the 
best long-term effects, see infra notes 211–17 and accompanying text. 
22.  See Dolin, supra note 7 at 283 (discussing how reverse payment agreements have 
developed as result of Hatch-Waxman incentives). 
23.  See id. at 286 (explaining Congress’s intent to bring lower cost generic drugs into 
market).  But see Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (discussing innovative 
consequences likely to be seen following ban of reverse payment settlements). 
24.  See Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (asserting strong concern for 
push to end reverse payment settlements and need for proper resolution).  For further 
discussion of the Act’s functionality and effects, see infra notes 25–50 and accompanying 
3
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A. Enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act as an Attempt to Counter High 
Market Prices 
The issue of reverse payment settlements has its origins in the enactment of 
the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, commonly 
known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.25  As a response to the high consumer costs 
experienced in the pharmaceutical industry, this legislation was proposed to 
encourage and increase the availability of generic alternatives to branded 
pharmaceutical medications.26  Congress formed the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
attempting to achieve three main objectives with the new application and 
approval process.27 
First, Congress looked to expedite the process of bringing cheaper generic 
alternatives into the market by streamlining the procedure for filing a patent 
challenge.28  Second, the Act was created to incentivize drug manufacturers to 
focus more on new drug development.29  Finally, Congress intended for the Act 
to assist in clearing the landscape of invalid patents.30  Congress attempted to 
strike the precise balance between encouraging pharmaceutical innovation and 
 
text. 
25.  See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 
98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (explaining legislation known as Hatch-Waxman Act and how 
amendments work); see also Dolin, supra note 7, at 283 (discussing rise of reverse payment 
settlements as consequence of incentives that derive from Hatch-Waxman Act).  
26.  See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 63 (asserting that Hatch-Waxman Act sought 
to provide greater incentives for generic companies to market generic versions of drugs 
available from higher priced pharmaceutical companies); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS 2 (2010), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/01/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf [hereinafter PAY-FOR-
DELAY] (stating that pay-for-delay settlements cost American consumers 3.5 billion dollars 
every year).  For further discussion of the economic impact of the act and the resulting 
consequences, see infra notes 158–210 and accompanying text. 
27.  See Dolin, supra note 7, at 286–87 (suggesting that enactment of Hatch-Waxman 
Act looked to achieve several purposes by streamlining approval process for generic 
alternatives to patented medications).  For further discussion of the objectives sought through 
this Act, see infra notes 51–71 and accompanying text. 
28.  See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 203 (3d Cir. 2012) (explaining that 
Congress hoped to jump-start generic entry into market by passing Hatch-Waxman Act).  
Congress used the new act to allow for an abbreviated application process for FDA approval.  
See id. (explaining process in place with Hatch-Waxman Act that allows for Abbreviated New 
Drug Applications);  see also Dolin, supra note 7, at 286–87 (suggesting three objectives that 
Congress had anticipated achieving with legislation of this Act).   
29.  See Scott A. Backus, Reversing Course on Reverse Payment Settlements in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry: Has Schering-Plough Created the Blueprint for Defensible Antitrust 
Violations?, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 375, 380 (2007) (discussing that first reason for Hatch-
Waxman Act is to induce pharmaceutical firms to effectively invest in research and 
development of new drugs); Reza Bagherian, The Preserve Access to Affordable Generics 
Act: Will Congress’s Response to Reverse Payment Patent Settlements Enhance Competition 
in the Pharmaceutical Market?, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 150, 152 (2007) 
(discussing hope that Act would result in new expenditures into research and development of 
certain products for market).  
30.  See Dolin, supra note 7, at 286–87 (asserting that final goal of Hatch-Waxman Act 
was to help clear out invalid patents).  The Act looked to encourage litigation over the patents 
protecting these pharmaceutical drugs.  See id. (explaining how Act would result in 
eliminating invalid patents). 
4
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ensuring fair competition.31 
With this delicate equilibrium in mind, Congress included a 180-day 
exclusivity period, allowing an exclusive right to sell for the first generic 
challenger who brought forward a drug sufficient to enter the market.32  
Congress utilized this exclusivity period in the hope that it would incentivize a 
greater influx of generic challengers.33  While on its face the enticement seems 
likely to produce the sought-after balance of innovation and competition, the 
functionality of the exclusivity period, and the Act as a whole, has actually 
resulted in the anticompetitive issues at hand.34 
B. The Hatch-Waxman Process and Functionality 
With the enactment of the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act, generic companies 
were given a procedure that allows patent challenges to accelerate through the 
application process by making use of an Abbreviated New Drug Application 
(ANDA).35  The procedure begins by a generic manufacturer seeking FDA 
approval of a new generic medication through the filing of the ANDA.36  The 
generic drug manufacturer asserting the ANDA must certify that one of the 
following four conditions are met: (1) no patent related to the pioneer drug has 
been filed; (2) the relevant patent has expired; (3) the patent will expire on a 
certain date; or (4) the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the 
manufacture, use, or sale of the generic drug entity.37  Most Hatch-Waxman 
litigation and resulting reverse payment settlements arise when the challenger 
 
31.  See Backus, supra note 29, at 380 (explaining that Hatch-Waxman Act emerged 
from Congress hoping to balance two conflicting policy issues). 
32.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 203–04 (explaining that first challenger to bring forward 
generic medication suitable for market will be allowed 180-day exclusivity period).  The FDA 
agrees to not approve another Abbreviated New Drug Application in the 180 days following 
the marketing of the first generic drug.  See id. (discussing protocol that will follow from 
successful patent challenge and exclusivity benefit first company will receive). 
33.  See id. at 204 (suggesting that first challenger to patent medication will then be 
most motivated due to this exclusivity period); see also Hemphill, supra note 9, at 1579 
(stating that reward for generic company that successfully challenges patent on major drug 
can be worth several hundred million dollars). 
34.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 203–04 (explaining that if first filer either settles, loses, or 
withdraws, subsequent filers will not be awarded this 180-day exclusivity period).  This 
results in only the first filer having any real motivation to go through with challenging the 
patent.  See id. (discussing heightened motivation from first challenger as opposed to any 
subsequent challengers); see also Hemphill, supra note 9, at 1588–91 (explaining that 
resulting settlement between pharmaceutical company and first generic manufacturer will 
likely end up dividing profits from remaining term of patent between two parties). 
35.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 203 (explaining process put in place following enactment 
of Hatch-Waxman Act amending Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act).  This short-form 
application allows reliance on the FDA’s prior consideration of safety and efficacy regarding 
the patented drug.  See id. (explaining how new ANDA utilizes FDA’s prior considerations to 
expedite approval process); see also Hanks et al., supra note 10, at 1–2 (asserting that Hatch-
Waxman Act allowed for generic manufacturers to file ANDA prior to expiration of patent 
rights without automatically triggering infringement).   
36.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 203 (explaining that new application process begins with 
filing ANDA). 
37.  See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (West 2012) (explaining four options 
available). 
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files a paragraph four certification.38 
Once the generic manufacturer files the ANDA, it is required to notify the 
patent holder of the application and certification under paragraph four.39  A 
forty-five day patentee response period follows, which allows the challenged 
pharmaceutical company to file an infringement claim automatically staying the 
ANDA approval process.40  When a conclusion is reached, or the stay is 
concluded, the first ANDA filer receives their 180-day exclusivity period as 
long as there is no failure to market their product.41  Pharmaceutical companies 
have responded by settling cases, effectively allowing them to maintain their 
patent rights and eliminate the exclusivity period privilege using the failure to 
market provision.42 
C. Reverse Payment Settlements as a Controversial Solution 
Pharmaceutical companies often respond to Hatch-Waxman litigation by 
settling prior to the generic drug entering the market.43  While settlements are a 
 
38.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 203 (stating that generic company at issue in present case 
used paragraph four certification, causing issue at hand); cf. Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 
64 (explaining that nearly all reverse payment settlements ultimately stem from challengers 
using fourth option for certification). 
39.  See Backus, supra note 29, at 382–83 (explaining that generic manufacturer must 
provide notice).  Further, the notice must provide a detailed statement of factual and legal 
grounding for the claim that the patent is either invalid or will not be infringed.  See id. 
(describing what information notice must contain in order to give proper warning); see also 
Brian Range, The ANDA Patent Certification Requirement and Thirty-Month Stay Provision: 
Is it Necessary? 2 (2001) (unpublished third year paper, Harvard Law School), available at 
http://leda.law.harvard.edu/leda/data/355/Range.pdf (noting that generic filer of ANDA under 
paragraph four must notify patent holder of challenge); cf. Bagherian, supra note 29, at 153 
(stating that generic manufacturer must notify patent holder of intent to enter market). 
40.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 203–04 (explaining that filing suit will result in automated 
stay preventing FDA approval for thirty months or until conclusion of court hearing).  
Following 2003 amendments to the Act, only one thirty-month stay is allowed in an attempt to 
prohibit strategically delaying a resolution.  See id. (stating that automated stay is in effect for 
thirty months or until resolution is reached); cf. Dolin, supra note 7, at 292 (discussing that 
only one thirty month stay is available to avoid over-extending postponement of resolution).   
41.  See Wansheng Jerry Liu, Balancing Accessibility and Sustainability: How to 
Achieve the Dual Objectives of the Hatch-Waxman Act While Resolving Antitrust Issues in 
Pharmaceutical Patent Cases, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 441, 453 (2008) (explaining that 
under new provisions, 180-day exclusivity period can be forfeited if first ANDA filer fails to 
market their generic version of patented drug prior to expiration dates). 
42.  See Matthew Avery, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by 
Pharmaceutical Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 
171, 191 (2008) (describing loophole that has allowed pharmaceutical companies to utilize 
settling as tool to not only keep their patent rights alive, but also to eliminate incentive for 
subsequent generic manufacturer).  Whether the generic company ends up losing the 
exclusivity period or not, the pharmaceutical company effectively eliminates the incentive in 
place.  See id. at 192 (explaining that if generic manufacturer forfeited exclusivity period, then 
subsequent generic challengers do not have access to exclusive selling rights because they are 
only offered to first ANDA filer).  Once the exclusivity period is not utilized, the generic 
manufacturer will forfeit the rights through the seventy-five day marketing provision put in 
place.  See id. (explaining that if generic manufacturer does not market drug within seventy-
five days, exclusivity period is forfeited and therefore eliminated for subsequent challengers). 
43.  See Hemphill, supra note 9, at 1553 (suggesting that challenging party often 
abandons suits that would likely increase competition, thus resulting in more settlements). 
6
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common resolution to patent claims, reverse payment settlements have come 
under scrutiny because they result in patent holders paying to keep alternative 
drugs off the shelves.44  This ingenious approach allows pharmaceutical 
companies to maintain patent rights for the relatively small price of sharing a 
designated amount of profits with the opposing generic producer.45  
Furthermore, the resolution eliminates any incentive for subsequent challengers 
to come forward with true intentions of entering the market because the 
exclusivity period is only granted to the first ANDA filer.46 
These reverse payment settlements have been criticized for having 
anticompetitive effects in the pharmaceutical industry.47  Wholesalers and 
manufacturers have begun filing class action claims against the settling parties 
involved in the agreements.48  These claims assert that the alleged 
anticompetitive consequences drive industry prices up and negatively affect 
consumer welfare.49  The resulting litigation has left the circuit courts in 
 
44.  See Dolin, supra note 7, at 293 (explaining that reverse payment settlements are 
unusual in that alleged infringing party receives payment and patent holder maintains patent 
rights).  About forty-five percent of settlements in this area of law result in such payments.  
See id. (discussing statistics of settlements in relevant types of cases and prevalence of reverse 
payments in such settlements); cf. The Legality of “Reverse Payments”, ANTITRUST 
COUNSELOR (Am. Bar Ass’n) (2010), at 1 (expressing that sometimes these reverse payment 
settlements keep generic drugs out of market). 
45.  See Scott Bergeson, A Vaccine Approach to the Reverse Payment Illness, 18 RICH. 
J.L. & TECH. 14, *2 (2012) (explaining that instead of risking financial benefits of losing their 
patent rights, pharmaceutical companies pay generic companies portion of profits in order to 
keep stronghold on monopolistic benefits of patent). 
46.  See id. at *4 (expressing further concern that this result eliminates exclusivity 
incentive for successive challengers); see also Dolin, supra note 7, at 292–93 (explaining that 
generic company can settle with patent holder, while still receiving financial benefits of 
exclusivity period). 
47.  See Backus, supra note 29, at 375 (asserting that FTC found reverse payment 
settlements to unfairly restrict generic entry into marketplace); see also Ian Y. Liu & Rebecca 
McNeill, The Pay-for-Delay Dilemma: Changes and Challenges Are on the Horizon for 
Innovative Pharmaceutical Companies, PHARMACEUTICAL FORMULATION & QUALITY 14 
(2011), available at http://www.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/wiley/pfq_20110607/ (explaining that 
pay-for-delay settlements are controversial business practice). 
48.  See generally In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(summarizing claim that reverse payment settlement agreement between pharmaceutical 
company and generic manufacturer was anticompetitive in nature); see also In re 
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (analyzing 
whether similar settlement illegally restricted competition); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust 
Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 194 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing settlement involving license to sell 
unbranded version of pertinent drug, along with cash payment in return for staying out of 
market); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003) (discussing reverse 
payment settlement); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms, Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1298–1300 
(11th Cir. 2003) (analyzing settlement involving payment of substantial sums from patent 
holder to generic manufacturer); Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799 
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (discussing settlement involving reverse payments). 
49.  See, e.g. K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 207–08 (explaining wholesalers and retailers brought 
suit against settling parties involved in K-Dur 20 generic alternatives); see also Butler & 
Jarosch, supra note 6, at 60 (discussing how challenges have been brought by both FTC and 
private litigants); cf. Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework 
for Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 50 (2009) (asserting that reverse payment 
settlements can cost consumers upwards of thirty-five billon dollars over ten years).   
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disarray, searching for the appropriate resolution to these disputes.50 
III. A CIRCUIT COURT PRECEDENT IN DISARRAY 
Although each settlement resulting from Hatch-Waxman challenges may 
differ in terms, the antitrust questions that arise are always a consequence of the 
underlying reverse payments.51  The circuits that first addressed the issue 
analyzed the relevant settlements under strict antitrust scrutiny, essentially 
creating a presumption of illegality.52  More recently, circuit courts have 
departed from the strict scrutiny approach, shifting towards a “scope of the 
patent” test.53  This method of examination attempts to determine whether the 
pertinent settlement exceeds the exclusionary scope of the related patent.54  The 
conflict in analytical approaches has created a muddled precedent in need of 
Supreme Court intervention.55 
A. The D.C. and Sixth Circuits Put a “Per Se” Stop to Reverse Payment 
Settlements 
In 2001, the D.C. Circuit handed down the first decision pertaining to 
reverse payment agreements.56  The court considered an arrangement that 
 
50.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209 (discussing different approaches taken by five previous 
circuit courts that have weighed in on issue); see also Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 66 
(describing conflicting approaches by different circuits resulting in circuit split); Hanks et. al, 
supra note 10, at 2 (explaining that as result of conflict over reverse payment settlements, split 
among circuit courts has emerged). 
51.  See Dolin, supra note 7, at 294 (explaining how settlements may have different 
terms, but there are common features in reverse payments). 
52.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209 (discussing first two circuits to address issues and 
analysis that were used in reaching conclusion); Cardizem, 332 F.3d 896 at 908 (holding that 
reverse payment settlement was per se illegal restraint of trade); Andrx, 256 F.3d at 813 
(holding that reverse payment was prima facie evidence of illegality of agreement). 
53.  See, e.g., Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1336 (holding that inquiry is whether 
agreements restrict competition beyond scope offered through protection of patent); 
Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 213 (holding that there is no cognizable injury as long as restraints are 
within scope of patent). 
54.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209 (explaining change in approach that has developed 
with latter three circuit decisions involving reverse payment settlements); Ciprofloxacin, 544 
F.3d at 1336 (holding that inquiry is whether agreements restrict competition beyond scope 
offered through protection of patent); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms. Inc., 344 F.3d 
1294, 1311 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that analysis should be whether any part of agreement 
went beyond protections provided by issued patent); Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 213 (holding that 
there is no cognizable injury as long as restraints are within scope of patent). 
55.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209 (explaining how approach taken by circuit courts had 
changed from presumed illegality to scope of patent inquiry); see also Bernard Persky & 
Morissa Falk, Reverse Payment Settlements: The Time for Change has Arrived, 3 
BLOOMBERG L. REP. 1, 5–6 (2010), available at 
http://knowledgenetwork.labaton.com/upload/Reverse-Payment-Settlements-The-Time-for-
Change-has-Arrived.pdf (explaining possibility for Supreme Court or congressional 
intervention resulting from circuit split). 
56.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 210 (discussing decision in Andrx).  See generally Andrx, 
256 F.3d 799 (resolving case involving reverse payments to keep generic manufacturer from 
entering market while patent litigation ensued). 
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effectively extended monopolistic effects by delaying generic entry into the 
market until a resolution to the litigation was reached.57  As a response to this 
proposed anticompetitive activity, the D.C. Circuit took the drastic measure of 
applying strict antitrust scrutiny.58  The court held the payment to be prima 
facie evidence of an illegal agreement not to compete.59  This decision 
established per se illegality for reverse payments.60 
Affirming the D.C. Circuit’s approach, the Sixth Circuit added to per se 
precedent for examining reverse payments.61  In 2003, the Sixth Circuit 
contemplated the first reverse payment settlement that attracted public 
scrutiny.62  The court held that the relevant agreement was “a classic example 
of a per se unreasonable restraint of trade.”63  This decision validated a per se 
approach that stood as preliminary legal precedent for reverse payment antitrust 
analysis.64 
 
57.  See Andrx, 256 F.3d. at 803 (explaining terms of agreement in question).  The 
terms of the agreement included payment of forty million dollars per year, paid quarterly, 
beginning the day of FDA approval of the generic drug and ending the day that the generic 
manufacturer decided to begin selling the new drug.  See id. at 803–04 (describing exact 
financial terms of agreement and outlining start and end date of payments).  The settlement in 
Andrx utilized a reverse payment to delay the marketing of the generic medication while the 
patent litigation unfolded.  See id. (discussing that agreement was in effect until resolution of 
litigation, not settlement to litigation). 
58.  See id. at 813 (implying that ten million dollar quarterly payment induced generic 
manufacturer, in this case Andrx, to not enter market when it otherwise would have).  
“Andrx’s argument that any rational actor would wait for resolution of the patent infringement 
suit is belied by the quid of HMRI’s quo.”  Id.   
59.  See id. (treating payment from patent holder to generic manufacturer as prima facie 
evidence of agreement not to compete); see also K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 210 (asserting that Andrx 
court found payment to be prima facie evidence of an illegal agreement). 
60.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209–10 (discussing first approach of strict antitrust scrutiny 
presuming illegality).  “Two of those courts—the first two to consider the question—
concluded that such agreements should be subject to strict antitrust scrutiny, at least where the 
settling parties attempted to manipulate the 180-day exclusivity period to block all potential 
generic competition.”  Id. at 209. 
61.  See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(applying per se illegality to agreement); see also Carrier, supra note 49, at 53 (asserting that 
Sixth Circuit would hold agreement to be per se illegal because patent holder not only delayed 
entry by challenging generic manufacturer but also delayed all entry of generic alternatives 
into market). 
62.  See generally Cardizem, 332 F.3d 896 (deciding legality of reverse payment 
settlement resolving Hatch-Waxman Act dispute); see also Dolin, supra note 7, at 294 
(explaining that real reverse settlement landscape began with Cardizem because it was one of 
first cases to attract public eye to controversial settlements).  
63.  Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 908 (quoting court’s reasoning verifying illegality).  The 
agreement exchanged cash payments in return for the insurance that the generic manufacturer 
would stay out of the market, even after receiving FDA approval.  See id. at 910 (explaining 
that plaintiffs asserted agreement between accused parties and put cash payment into effect 
when there was FDA approval, therefore delaying entry of approved generic alternative and 
delaying triggering of exclusivity period granted to that company); see also K-Dur, 686 F.3d 
at 210–11 (explaining that agreement in Cardizem prevented other generic manufacturers 
from entering  market by delaying triggering of first filer’s 180-day exclusivity period); cf. 
Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 68 (asserting that court found term of agreement ensuring 
delay of exclusivity period to be extension of anticompetitive nature, which denied access to 
all generic competitors).  
64.  See Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 907–09 (dismissing all of defendants pro-competitive 
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B. Subsequent Circuits Respond by Reversing the Trend of Reverse Payment 
Analysis 
Following the initial outcry for the illegality of reverse payment 
settlements, subsequent circuits diverged from per se analysis.65  Fortunately, in 
a later 2003 decision, the Eleventh Circuit asserted the right to exclude provided 
through patent protection.66  The court emphasized that an agreement 
advancing only patent protection could not be per se illegal.67  Instead, the 
inquiry turned on whether the settlement at issue stretched beyond the scope of 
the patent, consequently establishing the “scope of the patent” test.68 
Additionally, the Second and Federal Circuits would later add to the 
Eleventh Circuit’s precedent by applying a presumption of patent validity when 
utilizing the scope of the patent test.69  The courts advanced a strong judicial 
preference for allowing settlement, which outweighed any threat posed by 
invalid patents.70  The courts had begun to clearly deviate from the highly 
 
arguments and declaring per se illegality).  The court believed such a settlement could not be 
justified through expressing the need to enforce the patent rights because the settlement went 
beyond patent enforcement.  See id. at 908 (suggesting that it is not fair to describe settlement 
as simply enforcing patent rights, rather it was attempt to illegally extend benefits); see also 
Dolin, supra note 7, at 295 (explaining Sixth Circuit concluded agreements to be per se 
violation).  
65.  See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 213 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(applying presumption of patent validity); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms. Inc., 344 F.3d 
1294, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (analyzing policy concerns in favor of these settlements); see also 
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(maintaining scope of patent test as appropriate analysis for reverse payment settlements). 
66.  See Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1305 (asserting that name brand manufacturer had 
patent that allowed right to exclude competitors for designated time).  The agreement stopped 
alternatives from entering the market until after the patent expired.  See id. at 1300 (explaining 
that agreement between patent holder and generic manufacturer entailed that challenger agree 
to not sell or market alternative drug until patent was to expire).  Further, the generic 
manufacturer agreed to not transfer its rights under the ANDA filing, including the right to the 
180-day exclusivity period.  See id. (discussing remaining terms of contract that allowed for 
patent holder to keep all generic alternatives out of market).  In return for agreeing to not enter 
the market or waive its ANDA rights, the generic manufacturer was paid in increments based 
on an agreed upon schedule.  See id. (discussing details of agreement); see also Persky & 
Falk, supra note 55, at 5 (discussing three factors involved in determining antitrust liability, 
which include patent holder’s right to exclude).   
67.  See Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1301 (discussing district court’s ruling that 
agreements were per se antitrust violations of Section 1 of Sherman Act).  But see id. at 1306 
(reversing district court’s decision).  The Eleventh Circuit believed the rationale was flawed 
and that the agreements were not per se violations.  See id. (asserting that exclusionary effect 
of patent must be considered in determining restraint of trade caused by agreements).   
68.  See id. at 1311–12 (asserting that before applying any range of antitrust analysis, 
courts must look to whether agreement goes beyond patent protections).  The court here is 
explaining that it neither will apply a per se antitrust violation or the alternative rule of reason 
analysis provided for antitrust examinations.  See id. at 1312 (explaining that antitrust analysis 
ranges from per se to rule of reason, but one must first look at scope of patent protection for 
reverse payment settlements). 
69.  See Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (asserting no need to consider 
patent validity); Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 213 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying assumption of patent 
validity). 
70.  See Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 211 (explaining that judicial preference for settlement 
counters possibility of weak patents being able to extend their monopoly).  The court 
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assumptive per se approach; however, this trend would progress no further 
following the Third Circuit’s decision in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation.71 
IV. IN RE K-DUR ANTITRUST LITIGATION 
The recent Third Circuit case In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation addressed 
reverse payment settlements that were a result of challenges to the patent 
protecting the technology in the drug K-Dur 20.72  The Third Circuit’s decision 
to retreat back to a per se approach has generated more fear in the 
pharmaceutical industry and created a legitimate threat to pharmaceutical 
innovation.73  This substantiation of an evident circuit split validates the need 
for Supreme Court intervention and affirms a necessity for a resolution that 
allows reverse payment settlements to effectively and efficiently resolve Hatch-
Waxman disputes.74 
A. Facts and Procedure 
The issues in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation stem from two prior patent 
disputes that resulted in reverse payment settlements.75  K-Dur 20, a drug 
 
explained that the mechanics of the Hatch-Waxman Act offer logical reasons supporting 
settlement for both parties involved.  See id. at 206–07 (explaining that Hatch-Waxman 
litigation encourages both sides to settle).  Unlike normal patent infringement cases, Hatch-
Waxman disputes take place prior to any generic investment into the market.  See id. 
(explaining difference between normal patent infringement cases and Hatch-Waxman cases).  
Further, the patentee will not be able to recover any infringement damages if they push the 
litigation through.  See id. (discussing incentive for pharmaceutical patent holder to settle as 
well).  Settlement results in financial benefits for generic manufacturers prior to market 
investment and guarantees the patent holder that no infringement will take place.  See id. at 
207 (asserting mutual benefits resulting from settling Hatch-Waxman disputes); see also K-
Dur, 686 F.3d at 214 (stating that Second Circuit determined that risk of weak patents being 
extended is counterbalanced by judicial preference for allowing settlement resolutions). 
71.  See Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 212–13 (holding that as long as competition is 
restrained within scope of patent, then no injury to market is cognizable under existing 
antitrust law).  The court reaffirmed the Eleventh Circuit approach and additionally presumed 
patent validity.  See id. (asserting that patent validity is presumed and will only be questioned 
if accessed through fraud); see also Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1336 (holding that scope of 
patent test is to be applied).  “[T]he essence of the inquiry is whether the agreements restrict 
competition beyond the exclusionary zone of the patent.”  Id.  But see K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214 
(holding that scope of patent test improperly restricts antitrust analysis needed to correctly 
evaluate reverse payment settlements). 
72.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 197 (examining reverse payments surrounding patented 
drug K-Dur 20). 
73.  See id. at 218 (holding existence of reverse payments is prima facie evidence of 
illegality); cf. Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (asserting concerns for future 
pharmaceutical innovation). 
74.  See Liu & McNeill, supra note 47, at 15 (discussing opposing sides of argument 
that have been taken). 
75.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 202 (stating that this case originates from two previous 
patent cases involving drug K-Dur 20).  Settlement was reached when Upsher filed the first 
ANDA seeking approval for a generic version of K-Dur 20, asserting a different chemical 
compound make-up.  See id. at 205 (explaining first reverse payment settlement involving 
Schering’s K-Dur 20 drug).  Settlement was also reached when ESI Lederle filed an ANDA 
seeking approval of a generic form of K-Dur 20, allegedly utilizing different technology.  See 
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originally manufactured by Schering-Plough Corporation (Schering), received 
the #743 patent for the “microencapsulation” process utilized in the drug.76  
This newly patented development allowed for the slow dispersion of drug 
particles over an interval of time.77  The #743 patent was officially granted on 
September 5, 1989.78  Subsequently, two generic manufacturers brought 
challenges against this patent claiming a paragraph IV certification under the 
Hatch-Waxman Act.79 
1. Schering-Upsher Settlement 
In August 1995, the generic manufacturer Upsher Smith Laboratories filed 
the first ANDA seeking approval for a generic form of K-Dur 20.80  Providing 
a paragraph IV certification, Upsher claimed there was no patent infringement 
due to the use of a different chemical make-up in their controlled release 
coating.81  Following Upsher’s vigorous defense, the two parties settled just 
hours before the district court delivered a summary judgment decision.82 
The terms of the agreement allowed Upsher to maintain its claim that there 
was not patent infringement.83  Furthermore, Schering included a reverse 
payment incentive of sixty million dollars over the course of three years.84  In 
 
id. (discussing second settlement reached, further delaying generic entry of K-Dur 20 into 
market); see also Barkoff, supra note 16 (explaining two settlements at issue in this case were 
Schering-Upsher Smith agreement and Schering-ESI agreement). 
76.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 204–05 (explaining that Patent and Trademark Office 
issued patent #743 to Schering following their application to patent microencapsulation).  
After clarifying a difference in viscosity levels, the PTO approved a revised application for 
patent protection.  See id. at 205 (explaining differentiating factor in patent approval was 
greater viscosity level as compared to patent #399). 
77.  See id. (describing process of microencapsulation technique, which allows for slow 
dispersion of drug particles); see also RONALD T. DODGE CO., MICROENCAPSULATION, 
http://www.microencapsulation.net (last visited Sept. 10, 2012) (explaining process of 
microencapsulation).   
78.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 205 (stating date that revised application was officially 
granted patency). 
79.  For a further discussion regarding the challenges to the #743 patent, see infra notes 
80–93 and accompanying text. 
80.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 205 (explaining that Upsher filed first ANDA paragraph IV 
certification and was seeking FDA approval of generic alternative to K-Dur 20); see also 
Barkoff, supra note 16 (explaining that Upsher filed initial ANDA, which was shortly 
followed by ESI challenges and settlement). 
81.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 205 (asserting Upsher’s defense to patent infringement was 
due to differences in chemical composition of controlled release system).  
82.  See id. (explaining that agreement was reached in early morning of June 18, 1997, 
just hours before district court was to rule on pending motions for summary judgment).  “The 
settlement was memorialized in an eleven-page short-form agreement dated June 17, 1997.”  
Id. 
83.  See id. (asserting that agreement provided Upsher did not have to concede validity, 
infringement, or enforceability of #743 patent). 
84.  See id. at 205–06 (explaining Schering’s initial down payment was sixty million 
dollars over three-year period as well as pending additional payments in smaller sums); see 
also Third Circuit Agrees With FTC in Applying Stricter Reverse Payment Settlement Test, 
ANTITRUST TODAY, (July 31, 2012), http://www.antitrusttoday.com/2012/07/31/third-circuit-
agrees-with-ftc-in-applying-stricter-reverse-payment-settlement-test/ (discussing plaintiff’s 
argument that sixty million dollars was sham and paid as royalty for exchanged licenses in K-
12
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return for Schering’s payment offer, Upsher agreed to refrain from marketing 
this new generic alternative until September 1, 2001, extending Schering’s 
market hold for approximately six more years.85  An additional term, which the 
parties later used to support the legality of the reverse payment, was Upsher’s 
authorization of licenses allowing Schering to make and sell products developed 
by Upsher.86  This initial settlement provided Schering a brief window of 
security; however, a subsequent challenger would soon follow suit.87 
2. Schering-ESI Settlement 
Shortly after the Schering-Upsher settlement, ESI Lederle (ESI) filed 
another ANDA certifying the same absence of patent infringement.88  ESI 
claimed that its generic drug contained different chemical technology.89  After 
Schering’s claim of patent infringement, the two parties decided to mediate, and 
eventually settle.90 
The settlement agreement promised ESI a royalty-free license under the 
#743 patent starting January 1, 2004, which delayed their entry by almost nine 
years.91  Additionally, Schering agreed to a structured reverse payment of five 
million dollars and a successive varying sum based upon the FDA’s 
 
Dur).   
85.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 205 (explaining that Upsher agreed to stay out of market 
with its generic alternative to K-Dur 20 until September 1, 2001).  Schering agreed that on 
September 1, 2001, Upsher would receive a non-royalty, non-exclusive license under #743 
patent to freely sell its generic alternative in the open market.  See id. (asserting that Upsher 
had availability of open market following conclusion of agreement). 
86.  See id. at 205–06 (explaining dispute regarding reverse payments from Schering to 
Upsher).  While the settling parties, as defendants, insisted the payments to be consideration 
for the licenses, plaintiffs alleged reverse payments were strictly for delaying market entry.  
See id. at 206 (discussing two sides to dispute); see also Third Circuit Agrees with FTC, supra 
note 84 (explaining that plaintiffs alleged settlements were scams because they believed 
payment was simply to keep generic alternative from entering market and not for reasons 
asserted by defendants).  
87.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 206 (discussing second ANDA filed and resulting 
settlement).  The Schering-ESI litigation was settled with a similar reverse payment 
agreement.  See id. (discussing settlement that was reached). 
88.  See id. (explaining ESI Lederle filed subsequent challenge in December 1995); see 
also Paolo Morante & Jarod M. Bona, Third Circuit Rekindles Uncertainty in Patent 
Settlements Under Hatch-Waxman Act, DLA PIPER (July 25, 2012), available at 
http://www.dlapiper.com/us/publications/detail.aspx?pub=7262 (discussing December 1995 
ANDA filing from ESI and resulting litigation). 
89.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 206 (discussing paragraph IV certification).  ESI claimed 
its generic alternative used a coating with two different ingredients.  See id. (explaining ESI’s 
explanation for paragraph IV filing). 
90.  See id. (explaining that Schering and ESI agreed to court-supervised mediation to 
attempt to solve dispute).  In the fall of 1996, the two parties attempted to resolve their issues 
through mediation and eventually would reach the settlement at issue.  See id. (addressing 
mediation and results in fall of 1996); see also Barkoff, supra note 16 (explaining that 
Schering-ESI dispute ending in settlement).   
91.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 206 (discussing agreement calling for ESI to be granted 
royalty-free license as of January 1, 2004 for patent #743).  The product from ESI was then 
approved in May 1999, but Schering paid an additional ten million dollars as part of the 
agreement between the two parties.  See id. (explaining FDA approval of generic alternative, 
which would have allowed for generic entry into market if not for settlement with Schering). 
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determination of ESI’s ANDA filing.92  Both the initial Schering-Upsher 
settlement and the later Schering-ESI agreement would eventually fall under 
scrutiny from both the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and various private 
parties.93 
3. Resulting Litigation 
Initially, the FTC brought an action alleging the Schering settlements 
unreasonably restrained trade.94  While the Eleventh Circuit ultimately 
dismissed the FTC action, the holding in K-Dur seemed to validate the muddled 
circuit split.95  The Third Circuit’s decision in K-Dur poses a serious threat to 
future drug innovation and illustrates the need for Supreme Court 
intervention.96 
B. Third Circuit’s Analysis of Reverse Payment Settlements 
The Third Circuit began its analysis in K-Dur by surveying the general 
landscape of antitrust law.97  Applying the Sherman Act, the court stated, 
 
92.  See id. (discussing structured payments flowing from Schering to ESI if ESI agreed 
to stay out of market).  Schering paid five million dollars up front and then agreed to pay 
anywhere from $625,000 to ten million dollars based upon FDA approval.  See id. (explaining 
that Schering agreed to pay even more to ESI if generic drug was approved for market by 
FDA). 
93.  See Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 402 F.3d 1056, 1068–76 (11th 
Cir. 2005) (determining legality of settlements at issue in FTC action).  The Eleventh Circuit 
overruled an FTC ruling claiming the settlements were illegal because they unreasonably 
restrained trade.  See id. at 1076 (discussing holding of court).  “Simply because a brand-name 
pharmaceutical company holding a patent paid its generic competitor money cannot be the 
sole basis for a violation of antitrust law.”  Id.  “This alone underscores the need to evaluate 
the strength of the patent.”  Id.  “Our conclusion, to a degree, and we hope that the FTC is 
mindful of this, reflects policy.”  Id.; see also K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 206–09 (discussing actions 
brought by FTC, as well as private litigants in form of wholesalers and retailers). 
94.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 206–08 (discussing FTC action brought against settlements 
prior to private litigants alleging claim).  In March 2001, the FTC filed a claim against all 
three parties, Schering, ESI, and Upsher, alleging their settlements unreasonably restrained 
trade.  See id. (asserting FTC’s claims against parties alleging violations of antitrust law); see 
also Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1060–62 (examining FTC claims brought against 
settlements between Schering and generic competitors).  
95.  See Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1076 (holding FTC claims did not show 
unreasonable restraint of trade); K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218 (holding private litigants’ claims to 
be sufficient to hold Schering’s settlements illegal); see also Barkoff, supra note 16 (asserting 
that resulting circuit split will likely result in Supreme Court intervention).  Because there 
have been disagreements as to what tests to apply, the Supreme Court will likely weigh in to 
clarify the appropriate analysis for reverse payment settlements.  See id. (discussing 
differences in analysis of reverse payments).  
96.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214–19 (holding that settlements between Schering and 
their generic competitors were illegal due to unreasonable restraint of trade).  The Third 
Circuit believed that the scope of the patent was insufficient in determining legality of such 
settlements.  See id. at 214 (discussing disagreement with use of scope of patent test).   
97.  See id. at 208–09 (discussing general antitrust law and its applications).  The 
antitrust laws prohibit activity that restrains trade.  See id. (discussing basic standard for 
antitrust law under Sherman Act).  The Supreme Court has read the Act as applying to actions 
that only unreasonably restrain trade.  See id. (explaining what interpretation of Act has 
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“[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, 
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations, is declared to be illegal.”98  While the text of the Sherman Act appears 
to prohibit any restraint of trade, the Supreme Court has interpreted it to 
prohibit only an unreasonable restraint of trade.99  Furthermore, in analyzing 
the reasonableness of an alleged restraint of trade, the court discussed the scope 
of inquiry, which ranged from unyielding per se illegality to a more thorough 
“rule of reason” examination that utilizes the scope of the patent test.100 
The Third Circuit relied on general antitrust law and reverse payment 
precedent to establish the guiding criteria for their analysis of the Schering-
Upsher and Schering-ESI settlements.101  After examining the case law for 
reverse payment settlements, the court proposed two options for determining the 
validity of the agreements.102  The court could subject the settlements to strict 
antitrust scrutiny with a presumption of per se illegality or it could apply the 
scope of the patent test.103  Ultimately, the Third Circuit contradicted the recent 
circuit court trend and refused to apply the scope of the patent test.104 
 
developed to become).   
98.  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004) (explaining activity prohibited by Act); see also K-Dur, 686 
F.3d at 208 (quoting Sherman Antitrust Act).   
99.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1.  But see K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209 (discussing Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of Act).  “Under a literal reading, this provision would make illegal every 
agreement in restraint of trade.”  Id. at 208–09.  “However, it has not been so interpreted.  
Rather the Supreme Court has long construed it to prohibit only unreasonable restraints.”  Id. 
at 209.   
100.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209 (discussing analysis used to examine activity alleged 
of unreasonably restraining trade).  A rule of reason analysis is traditionally used.  See id. 
(examining factors considered when determining legality of activity alleged illegal under 
antitrust law).  Courts have also acknowledged that some activities clearly restrain free trade 
and therefore are deemed per se illegal.  See id. (stating that courts have held certain activities 
per se illegal therefore shifting burden to restraining party); cf. Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, 
at 66 (discussing array of applications when analyzing reverse payments).  Some courts have 
given reverse payment settlements a heightened level of scrutiny, while others have applied 
very little or no antitrust scrutiny.  See id. (asserting stark differences in antitrust analysis 
applied to reverse payment settlements when examined by different circuit courts). 
101.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 208–15 (surveying antitrust law along with case law 
precedent).  The court established antitrust analysis, along with diverging approach taken by 
previous circuit court.  See id. (examining law that court had to pull from in order to analyze 
alleged anticompetitive settlement). 
102.  See id. at 210–15 (examining previous circuit court precedent that had been 
established since enactment of Hatch-Waxman Act).  For further discussion of the court’s 
options in reviewing the reverse payment settlement, see infra notes 103–04 and 
accompanying text. 
103.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214 (discussing options of addressing issue at hand).  The 
court could use the approach taken by the first circuits to handle reverse payments, or side 
with the more recent migration towards a scope of the patent test.  See id. (explaining 
differences in approaches previously used by circuit courts when addressing legality of 
reverse payment settlements); cf. Backus, supra note 29 at 405–12 (scanning range from per 
se illegality approach, to rule of reason analysis, to hybrid rule of reason application).  The 
main differences regarding the middle ground approach deals with shifting burden of proof 
between claimant and patent holder.  See id. at 410–11 (discussing blended quick-look rule of 
reason approach). 
104.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214 (discussing decision to not apply scope of patent test).  
“After consideration of the arguments of counsel, the conflicting decisions in the other 
15
Steinniger: Shortsighted Response to Reverse Payments: How the Third Circuit
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
2013] NOTE 103 
In disagreeing with the scope of the patent test, the court first took aim at 
the presumption of patent validity that corresponds with the assessment.105  
The court’s analysis referred to the high success rates of paragraph IV 
challenges under the Hatch-Waxman Act, noting the high percentage of patents 
that are eventually determined to be invalid.106  The court stressed that patents 
are a legal conclusion issued by the Patent Office and the judicial system should 
play an important role in carefully analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of 
these challenged patents.107  Moreover, the court dismissed the proposition that 
subsequent challengers would effectively follow and eliminate weak patents.108  
The Third Circuit contended that the monopolistic profit margin stemming from 
reverse payment settlements would allow for the patent holder to pay off 
numerous generic manufacturers while still maintaining strong earnings.109 
 
circuits, the Report of the Special Master, and our own reading, we cannot agree with those 
courts that apply the scope of the patent test.”  Id.; see also In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride 
Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d at 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (concurring with Eleventh and Second 
Circuits in applying scope of patent test); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 
187, 200 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that appropriate approach is to insert scope of patent 
examination); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1298 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(applying scope of patent test to reverse payment).   
105.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214 (asserting court’s disapproval of scope of patent test).  
“First, we take issue with the scope of the patent test’s almost unrebuttable presumption of 
patent validity.”  Id.; cf. Backus, supra note 29, at 408–10 (discussing proponents for 
settlements that support presumption of legality).  The presumption of legality in reverse 
payment settlements allows for reduced costs and increased efficiency.  See id. at 408 
(explaining why presumption of legality is sometimes supported).  The Eleventh and Second 
Circuits applied this presumption of legality.  See id. (noting circuit court precedent in support 
of this approach).  
106.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 215 (asserting that generic challenger ultimately prevails 
in seventy-three percent of challenges).  An FTC study concluded that a high percentage of 
challengers are successful in their claims.  See id. (discussing court’s disagreement with 
allowing presumption of legality); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY 
PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION 16 (2002), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf [hereinafter GENERIC DRUG ENTRY] 
(examining statistical data regarding challenges by generic manufacturers and results 
produced).  The generic manufacturers succeeded at a high rate when challenging existing 
patent holders.  See id. (citing percentages in favor of generic challengers that bring paragraph 
IV claims).  
107.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214–15 (discussing need for judicial supervision and 
intervention when analyzing patents).  The court stressed the concern for allowing holders of 
weak patents to use their stronger financial position to extend the monopolistic effects of their 
patent.  See id. at 215 (asserting need for judicial system to play part in limiting monopolistic 
abilities of weak patents).  
108.  See id. (questioning Second Circuit assumption that subsequent challengers would 
effectively eliminate weak patents).  “We note that the initial generic challenger is necessarily 
the most motivated because, unlike all subsequent challengers, it stands to benefit from the 
180-day exclusivity period of 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).”  Id.; cf. Dolin, supra note 7, at 
292–93 (explaining mechanics of Hatch-Waxman Act, particularly exclusivity period allowed 
for first filers). 
109.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 215 (expressing concern over monopolistic margins that 
enable patent holder to pay off series of generic manufacturers challenging patent); cf. Kal 
Raustiala & Chris Sprigman, Why Do Patent Holders Sometimes Pay Patent Copiers?, 
FREAKONOMICS (July 30, 2012), http://www.freakonomics.com/2012/07/30/why-do-patent-
holders-sometimes-pay-patent-copiers (explaining gains made from patented drug sales).  A 
case involving the drug Cipro dealt with an antibiotic that had annual sales exceeding one 
16
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After assessing the policy concerns, the circuit court detailed the test they 
would employ and its implications moving forward.110  The court stressed that 
once parties include a reverse payment in a settlement, antitrust analysis is 
triggered and the scope of the patent test is not sufficient.111  Furthermore, the 
court concluded that any payment from patent holder to generic manufacturer 
must be treated as prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade.112  
Ultimately, the Third Circuit regressed reverse payment analysis to an approach 
of per se illegality.113 
C. Consequences of the K-Dur Decision Moving Forward 
Through the Third Circuit decision in K-Dur, reverse payment precedent 
has shifted back towards the per se rule.114  It has left lower courts with six 
circuit court decisions that attempt to advance conflicting policy objectives.115  
This reversion back to per se illegality has endangered business incentives that 
patent law uses to drive pharmaceutical innovation.116  The Supreme Court 
 
billion dollars.  See id. (explaining how patent drug sales create margins exceedingly higher 
than most reverse payment settlements). 
110.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218 (rejecting scope of patent test).  “In its place we will 
direct the District Court to apply a quick look rule of reason analysis based on the economic 
realities of the reverse payment settlement rather than the labels applied by the settling 
parties.”  Id.  
111.  See id. at 216–17 (expressing caution to limit K-Dur decision to reverse payments 
in this setting).  “We caution that our decision today is limited to reverse payments between 
patent holders and would be generic competitors in the pharmaceutical industry.”  Id.  
112.  See id. at 218 (asserting reverse payments as prima facie evidence of unreasonable 
restraint of trade).  “In holding that a reverse payment is prima facie evidence of an 
unreasonable restraint of trade, we follow the approach suggested by the DC Circuit in 
Andrx . . . .”  Id.  
113.  See id. (holding reverse payments to be prima facie evidence of unreasonable 
restraint of trade); cf. Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 66 (examining circuit split over 
analyzing reverse payment settlements).  The first circuit courts to analyze this issue held 
reverse payment settlements to be per se illegal.  See id. at 66–67 (explaining per se illegality 
and its reinstallment by Third Circuit). 
114.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218 (applying per se approach to hold that reverse 
payments are prima facie evidence of illegality).  
115.  See id. (holding reverse payments as prima facie evidence of unreasonable 
restraint of trade); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1336 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that correct application is scope of patent test); In re Tamoxifen 
Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 213 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding presumption of patent 
validity and applying scope of patent test); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 
908 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding reverse payments to be per se illegal); Valley Drug Co. v. 
Geneva Pharms. Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1311–12 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that court should 
examine whether agreement went beyond protections afforded by patent in question); Andrx 
Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 813 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding reverse 
payments to be prima facie evidence of illegality).   
116.  See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 66 (discussing circuit split and policy 
objectives driving each position).  “On one hand, patents give their holders exclusive rights to 
use the patented good, spurring innovation.”  Id.; see also Carrier, supra note 49, at 62 
(discussing courts’ reasoning to defer to settlements because of innovation).  By disallowing 
settlement in such cases, the courts could possibly harm innovative incentives by increasing 
uncertainty in patent law.  See id. (examining impact that courts’ disallowance of reverse 
payment settlements could have on pharmaceutical innovation).  
17
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must act to establish clear precedent and allow for reverse payment settlements 
to properly resolve patent litigation.117  The Third Circuit overlooked economic 
and policy concerns that must be highlighted in order to ensure that the most 
economically effective analytical approach is established for evaluating reverse 
payment settlements.118 
V. THIRD CIRCUIT’S “PER SE” APPROACH IS A “PER SE” CONCERN TO THE 
FUTURE OF NEW DRUG INNOVATION 
To have a comprehensive evaluation of reverse payment settlements, there 
must be a detailed examination of both policy incentives and the resulting 
economic effects.119  Circuit court precedent has pitted patent exclusion against 
protecting consumer costs.120  The fallout from each side of the disagreement 
carries with it extensive consequences for consumers in the pharmaceutical 
industry.121 
 
117.  See Barkoff, supra note 16 (stating that many observers believe Supreme Court 
will intervene after K-Dur holding).  “Because of the circuit split, many observers believe that 
with this case, the Supreme Court will finally address the legality of reverse payment 
settlements.”  Id.; see also Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 109 (recognizing likely Supreme 
Court intervention).  But see Holman, supra note 11, at 573–78 (expressing unlikelihood of 
Supreme Court intervention at time of publication).  Prior to the Third Circuit’s K-Dur 
decision, the scope of patent test was regarded as the likely test moving forward.  See id. at 
577–78.  “Some have implied that, without Supreme Court intervention, the Second Circuit’s 
test will essentially be locked in as the law of the land, because defendants will appeal all FTC 
decisions to the Second Circuit.”  Id. 
118.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214–19 (discussing policy concerns driving Third Circuit 
approach).  The court identified issues regarding consumer protection and patent weakness, 
but failed to address innovation incentives provided by patent law.  See id. (asserting clear 
position against reverse payments without considering positive effects they may have).  But 
see Dolin, supra note 7, at 318 (discussing problems posed by reverse payment analysis).  By 
disallowing reverse payment settlements to resolve these issues, exclusion rights offered by 
patent law are affected and litigation would increase; therefore, generic entry would be 
delayed further and the very purpose of the Act would fail.  See id. at 319 (arguing that 
disallowance of reverse payment settlements “would push more disputes into litigation where 
the outcome is far from certain”).   
119.  See Backus, supra note 29, at 380 (discussing policy objectives that must be 
balanced through Hatch-Waxman resolution).  The Act and its results need to weigh the 
delicate balance between continuing to encourage innovation, while still bringing cheaper 
alternatives into the market.  See id. (asserting need to maintain balance and consider both 
policy objectives); see also Hanks et al., supra note 10, at 1 (explaining financial impact of 
resolution of reverse payment issues).  The resolution of the question regarding reverse 
payment settlements involves billions of dollars.  See id. (showing economic impact of 
resolution regarding issue of reverse payment settlements). 
120.  See Bagherian, supra note 29, at 160–66 (discussing different approaches taken 
by courts, such as per se approach, rule of reason analysis, and scope of patent test); see also 
Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 86–87 (discussing policy reversal regarding approach to 
reverse payment settlements).  The analysis gravitated from a per se approach to a more 
detailed inquiry known as rule of reason analysis.  See id. (noting that policy reversal had 
taken place over time). 
121.  See Hanks et al., supra note 10, at 1 (asserting that reverse payment settlements 
protect twenty billion dollars in sales of patented drugs from generic competition).  In 
addition, “the FTC estimates that reverse payment settlement cost consumers $3.5 billion a 
year—or $35 billion over the next 10 years.”  Id.  
18
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A. Misguided Policy Objectives Overshadow More Important Innovative 
Consequences 
The Third Circuit has reignited arguments that do not address the entirety 
of the reverse payment settlement issue.122  While the court concentrated on the 
immediate concerns of high consumer costs and weak patents, it failed to 
sufficiently examine the more prominent long-term effects on pharmaceutical 
innovation and consumer needs.123  By applying this approach to reverse 
payment settlements, courts risk endangering the entire pharmaceutical industry 
and creating uncertainty in patent protection.124 
1. The Per Se Attempt to Eliminate Reverse Payment Settlements 
The Third Circuit has rekindled the per se approach, declaring reverse 
payments to be prima facie evidence of illegality.125  The court highlighted 
concerns including the high rate of success for generic manufacturers in Hatch-
Waxman litigation, a patent holder’s ability to utilize high profit margins to 
forcefully maintain market control, and a divergence from enforcing the very 
purposes of the Hatch-Waxman Act.126  The court asserted the belief that 
reverse payment settlements would hamper generic entry and consequently, 
consumer costs would continue to increase.127 
According to oppositions of the scope of the patent test, this examination 
fails to address the issue of weak or invalid patents because it coincides with a 
presumption of patent validity.128  A Federal Trade Commission (FTC) study 
asserted that seventy-three percent of paragraph IV challenges pushed to 
 
122.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214–19 (asserting concerns for high costs and weak 
patents). 
123.  See id. (expressing concern for invalid patents and high costs).  But see Reverse-
Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (asserting concerns for more important issues of long-
term innovation and consumer welfare in future). 
124.  See Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (insisting that ban on reverse 
payment settlements would lead to detrimental effects in entire pharmaceutical industry). 
125.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218 (declaring payments from patent holder to challenger 
as prima facie evidence of unreasonable restraint of trade).   
126.  See id. at 215 (citing to FTC conclusions finding generic manufacturer to be 
successful seventy-three percent of time).  “[T]he high profit margins of a monopolist drug 
manufacturer may enable it to pay off a whole series of challengers . . . .”  Id. (expressing 
concern for patent holder’s ability to pay off multiple challengers, resulting in market hold).  
“The goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act is to increase the availability of low cost generic drugs.”  
Id. at 217 (asserting goals of Hatch-Waxman Act that have been overlooked recently).  
127.  See id. at 217 (discussing goal of Act, which is to lower cost).  The goal is 
undermined by applying scope of the patent test and allowing reverse payment settlements 
because it allows patent holder to keep generic alternatives out of the market.  See id. 
(expressing concern for goals of Act); cf. Hanks et al., supra note 10, at 1 (asserting cost to 
consumers caused by reverse payment settlements).  The FTC estimated the consumer cost to 
be roughly thirty-five billion dollars over the next ten years.  See id. (expressing extreme 
financial effects).   
128.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214–15 (discussing disagreement with assumption of 
patent validity).  The scope of the patent test had previously been applied by circuit courts 
with a presumption of patent validity and the Third Circuit does not agree with such an 
approach.  See id. (expressing issue based on FTC study showing many paragraph IV 
challenges to ultimately be successful).   
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litigation are successful; therefore, some courts have highlighted a need for 
judicial resolve they felt was necessary to clear the weak patents.129  
Ultimately, courts have taken clear anti-settlement stances at times.130 
2. A Sufficient Conflict Insufficiently Addressed 
While several circuits have encouraged judicial activism in clearing the 
patent landscape, those courts have overlooked some important considerations 
when applying this per se rule.131  First, although weak patents may exist, the 
regulatory patent process helps to promote innovation and development.132  
The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) issues patents to parties that have 
invested in new inventions, whether in the pharmaceutical industry or any 
other.133  If there is a need for system maintenance, the legislature could take 
action to improve the PTO’s effectiveness.134 
When reviewing reverse payments, courts should consider the 
anticompetitive effects of the reverse payment, not the strength of the patent.135  
Through judicial activism, the courts will intervene in the patent process and 
risk interfering with the agency duties of the PTO.136  Further, courts are 
 
129.  See id. at 215 (citing to FTC study); see also GENERIC DRUG ENTRY, supra note 
106 (asserting statistical data showing seventy-three percent of paragraph IV challenges to be 
successful).  The generic manufacturer had a very high success rate, which would result in 
increased generic alternatives if not for reverse payment settlements.  See id. (discussing how 
reverse payment settlements inhibit generic availability in market).   
130.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218 (holding that reverse payment settlement was prima 
facie evidence of unreasonable restraint of trade).   
131.  See Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (raising concern about possible 
bans on reverse payment settlements).  Arguing that future drug innovation from branded 
pharmaceutical companies would be endangered and generic companies would be dissuaded 
from challenging patents without the option to settle claims prior to expensive litigation.  See 
id. (expressing concern for branded pharmaceutical companies and generic manufacturers if 
reverse payment settlements were banned). 
132.  See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., PATENTS AND INNOVATION: 
TRENDS AND POLICY CHALLENGES 9 (2004), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/science/scienceandtechnologypolicy/24508541.pdf (discussing patent 
system’s ability to foster innovation).  “Viewed from the angle of innovation policy, patents 
aim to foster innovation in the private sector by allowing inventors to profit from their 
inventions.”  Id.  
133.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 215 (explaining that patent is legal conclusion issued by 
patent office); see also PATENTS AND INNOVATION: TRENDS AND POLICY CHALLENGES, 
supra note 132, at 9 (discussing patents’ purpose of fostering innovation through allowing 
inventors to profit from inventions).  
134.  See Dolin, supra note 7, at 319–20 (discussing current reexamination process in 
place for PTO).  “After a patent issues, it is presumed valid.”  Id. at 319.  While reverse 
payment settlements avoid litigation and preserve the presumption of validity, the PTO 
provides another option for reexamination.  See id. (explaining that although court will not 
address patent validity if presented with reverse payment settlement, patent can still be 
reexamined by PTO). 
135.  See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006) (stating that patents shall be presumed valid); see also 
Carrier, supra note 49, at 62–63 (discussing presumption of validity previously applied by 
courts).  The Patent Act states that patents shall be presumed valid.  See id. at 62 (explaining 
why patents should be presumed valid).  
136.  See Dolin, supra note 7, at 319 (explaining how antitrust approach to clearing 
weak patents is insufficient).  “Patent law, the very tool Congress used to create the Hatch-
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muddying the analysis of reverse payment settlements by considering patent 
strength or weakness.137  The court’s departure from a presumption of patent 
validity further complicates the issue and likely will cause undesirable 
results.138  An independent examination of the restraint of trade should 
determine the validity of reverse payments.139 
Second, the Third Circuit called attention to the high profit margins that 
allow patent holders to pay off generic challengers.140  This may be a plausible 
assertion, but the court failed to contemplate the importance of maintaining 
these profit margins to ensure future development.141  Pharmaceutical 
companies continue to strive for more innovation because they have the 
financial security of patent law.142  Judicial interpretation of patent strength in 
these cases will apply a level of scrutiny that will bring uncertainty to the future 
of intellectual property rights.143  Courts must consider the consequences of 
this increased scrutiny.144 
 
Waxman Act, is a far better instrument to address these issues.”  Id.  
137.  See Carrier, supra note 49, at 63 (discussing mixing of analysis when analyzing 
reverse payment settlements).  Courts have made it clear that there is no legal support for 
public property rights in private disputes and agreements.  See id. (explaining that public’s 
rights to lower prices should not be considered in private lawsuits).  The settling parties in 
these cases have no duty to outside public parties to lessen monopolistic effects in the market.  
See id. (discussing settling parties). 
138.  See id. at 63 (explaining courts concern for adverse effects on patent licenses); see 
also Bagherian, supra note 29, at 167 (discussing per se approach to ruling settlements invalid 
could have chilling effect on patent settlement).   
139.  See Dolin, supra note 7, at 318–19 (examining tension between antitrust law and 
patent law).  There is a sharp conflict between a patent’s right to exclude and antitrust issues 
under the Sherman Act.  See id. (elaborating on conflict between these two areas of law).   
140.  See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 215 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing 
policy concerns regarding patent holder’s ability to pay off list of subsequent challengers).  
The high profit margins give patent holder opportunity to give up some profits instead of 
losing exclusionary rights offered through its patent.  See id. (asserting strong concern with 
financial position of patent holder).   
141.  See Hemphill, supra note 9, at 1574–75 (discussing considerations of competition 
and innovation).  “The innovator’s argument is that a lenient policy toward settlement 
increases patentee profits, which preserves and improves the incentive to innovate.”  Id. at 
1575.  This strong preference for promoting innovation should be followed by antitrust law 
through allowing a lenient approach to analyzing reverse payment settlements.  See id. 
(promoting antitrust law’s merging towards favoring settlement).   
142.  See Holman, supra note 11, at 503–04 (discussing high profitability of branded 
drugs).  When patent protections cease, profit margins and market share are quickly eroded by 
generic entry.  See id. at 503 (explaining sharp decrease in value when patent expires).  “The 
high profitability of branded drugs motivates drug patent owners to take extreme measures to 
maintain and enforce their patent rights.”  Id. at 503–04. 
143.  See Hemphill, supra note 9, at 1600–01 (discussing Patent Act).  Antitrust 
liability is often withheld when dealing in the area of patent protection.  See id. (explaining 
judicial recognition of patent exceptionalism).  Cases dealing with reverse payment 
settlements have been sprinkled with notions to withhold antitrust analysis because one party 
possesses a patent, which carries with it exclusionary rights.  See id. (explaining that antitrust 
analysis has often been handled in this area of law).   
144.  See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 90 (discussing how reverse payment 
settlements allow innovator to increase patent value).  “Because reverse-payment settlements 
increase the value of the underlying patent to the patent holder, they also increase the brand-
name company’s incentive to innovate . . . .”  Id.; see also Carrier, supra note 49, at 62 
(discussing how restricting settlements can lead to more uncertainty for patent holders).  
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Finally, the Third Circuit stressed that reverse payment settlements conflict 
with the purposes of the Hatch-Waxman Act.145  Reverse payment settlements 
have developed as the most effective solution to Hatch-Waxman disputes 
because they benefit both parties involved.146  These settlements are a 
consequence of faulty mechanics and should not be eliminated through judicial 
intervention.147  The effects of the Hatch-Waxman legislation may not have 
been as intended but amending the procedure should be left to the 
legislature.148 
3. Dependence of Pharmaceutical Innovation on the Proper Resolution to 
Reverse Payment Settlements 
The policy concerns advanced in K-Dur are important, but they do not fully 
encompass the problem.149  Applying per se illegality to reverse payment 
settlements may help clear the landscape of invalid patents and allow for more 
generic entry into the market, but it does not address the implications for 
innovation.150  The per se approach fails to consider its long-term effects on 
 
Denying reverse payment settlements will increase uncertainty and delay innovation.  See id. 
(asserting policy concern). 
145.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217 (discussing Hatch-Waxman Act goal of encouraging 
more challenges to weak or invalid patents).  “One method Congress employed was to 
encourage litigation challenges by generic manufacturers against the holders of weak or 
narrow patents.”  Id.  
146.  See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 206 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(asserting that Hatch-Waxman Act encouraged reverse payment settlements); see also Day, 
supra note 11, at 230 (explaining that some have argued reverse payment settlements 
inevitably result from Hatch-Waxman Act).  “Others have argued that reverse payments are an 
inevitable by-product of the Hatch-Waxman context and so long as the settlement does not 
exceed the scope of the patent holder’s right to exclude, reverse payments are acceptable.”  
Id.; Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 109 (discussing how reverse payment is beneficial to 
both sides involved).  The patent holder keeps market control and the generic competitor buys 
itself financial certainty.  See id. (elaborating on benefits of reverse payment settlements). 
147.  See Dolin, supra note 7, at 320–22 (discussing reexamination process and patent 
validity determination).  If the Patent Office Director determines that a substantial new 
question is raised affecting any claim of a patent, then there can be reexamination for 
resolution of the question at hand.  See id. at 320–21. (explaining process of allowing 
reexamination of patent by PTO).   
148.  See id. at 318 (discussing goals of Hatch-Waxman Act).  Antitrust law is an 
imperfect tool to address the issue of reverse payment settlements and to advance Congress’s 
goals.  See id. at 319 (explaining inefficacy of antitrust law in fulfilling congressional intent). 
149.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214–15 (discussing policy concerns in favor of per se 
approach).  “First, we take issue with the scope of the patent test’s almost unrebuttable 
presumption of patent validity.”  Id. at 214.  “[T]he high profit margins of a monopolist drug 
manufacturer may enable it to pay off a whole series of challengers rather than suffer the 
possible loss of its patent through litigation.”  Id. at 215.  The court found serious issue in the 
alleged ability for would-be competitors to share in monopolistic gains.  See id. at 216 
(expressing concern for allowing these parties to settle in this manner). 
150.  See id. at 214–15 (considering policy issues of patent validity and monopolistic 
market effects); see also Dolin, supra note 7, at 286–87 (discussing objectives of Hatch-
Waxman Act).  The Act attempted to bring a greater amount of lower priced generic drugs to 
the market and assist in clearing the landscape of weak or invalid patents.  See id. (elaborating 
on multiple purposes of Act). 
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patent incentives in the pharmaceutical industry.151 
Reducing consumer costs is an issue that should be addressed, but it is 
important to maintain patent rights so that the system in place ensures the 
medical field will continue to advance.152  The financial motivations stemming 
from patent exclusion rights present pharmaceutical companies with a certain 
level of assurance.153  Without preserving that level of certainty, patent law 
will be unable to continue incentivizing pharmaceutical innovation.154 
There is a clear difference of opinion as to what approach is needed to 
appropriately resolve the issue of reverse payment settlements.155  Important 
policy concerns have been addressed and contemplated, but all theoretical 
declarations remain hollow without concrete analysis to support their claims.156  
Through an economic examination, the per se approach is shown to have 
negative consequences over time.157 
 
151.  See Hemphill, supra note 9, at 1562–63 (discussing drug makers’ strong reliance 
on profits from patents).  “New drugs are developed in anticipation of the profits that patents 
secure.”  Id. at 1562.  The pharmaceutical field faces innovation problems not seen in others 
industries.  See id. at 1562–64 (discussing cumulative innovation). 
152.  See id. at 1562–63 (discussing importance of patents in pharmaceutical industry).  
“[P]harmaceuticals have been associated with the case for strong patents.”  Id. at 1564; see 
also Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 90 (discussing increase of patent power equating to 
more incentive to innovate).  Innovation leads to more consumption, greater profit margins, 
and better competition in the pharmaceutical industry.  See id. (explaining that competition is 
key driver of innovation in pharmaceutical industry). 
153.  See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 203 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(asserting concerns regarding increased uncertainty and delayed innovation); see also Carrier, 
supra note 49, at 62 (addressing previously stated issue of hampering goals of patent system).  
The Tamoxifen court noted the increased uncertainty caused by restricting settlements, which 
could lead to delayed innovation.  See id. (discussing drawbacks to restricting settlements); 
Holman, supra note 11, at 503 (asserting pharmaceutical branded companies rely heavily on 
protection offered by patents).  “[A] branded drug company’s profit margins are to a large 
extent dependant upon the market exclusivity provided by patents.”  Id.  
154.  See Josh Bloom, Yes: Innovation Demands It, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204542404577156993191655000.html#artic
leTabs%3Darticle (asserting serious need for patent protection and extension).  “Without 
extended patent protection for new discoveries, the industry won’t be able to fund the current 
level of research.”  Id.  
155.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217 (applying per se approach); In re Ciprofloxacin 
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (applying scope of 
patent test with presumption of patent validity); Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d 187, 194 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(applying scope of patent test); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 
2003) (applying per se approach); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms, Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 
1298 (11th Cir. 2003) (changing analysis to scope of patent approach); Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. 
Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (applying per se approach). 
156.  See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 57 (explaining that more detailed analysis is 
needed for reverse payment settlements because effects are not obvious); cf. Hemphill, supra 
note 9, at 1558 (discussing substantial attention offered to these cases).  Economists and legal 
scholars devote much analysis to reverse payment settlements in light of their economic 
importance and deepening confusion about their resolution.  See id. (explaining complex 
situation analyzed by scholars and economists). 
157.  See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 63 (asserting that application of per se rule 
comes with significant risks).  “Courts that limit the antitrust analysis of reverse payments by 
applying per se rules risk committing significant errors.”  Id.  
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B. Future Economic Impact of a Resolution to the Reverse Payment Conflict 
By applying a per se approach to reverse payment settlements, courts 
essentially attempt to eliminate the option to settle in this fashion.158  Those 
supporting a per se approach believe that eliminating these agreements will 
result in a greater volume of generic alternatives and consequently lower 
consumer costs.159  Although this argument, on its face, appears to address the 
problem of high costs, further economic analysis renders contrary results.160  
Banning reverse payment settlements would have negative effects on branded 
pharmaceutical manufacturers’ incentives to innovate, threaten the cash 
liquidity positions of generic developers, and dramatically increase the risk of 
pursuing a Hatch-Waxman challenge.161  Reverse payment settlements must be 
allowed to continue providing parties with a method of resolution that allows 
for future pharmaceutical innovation, generic reinvestment, and long-term 
consumer welfare.162 
1. Problematic, Short-Term Outlook of the Per Se Approach 
Supporters of the per se approach to reverse payment settlements look to 
consumer protection as their principal argument.163  Congress enacted the 
Hatch-Waxman Act in order to drive pharmaceutical prices down by making 
generic alternatives widely available in the marketplace.164  From an economic 
standpoint, the Act attempted to increase the elasticity of demand in the 
 
158.  See id. at 66–67 (explaining that per se approach creates irrebuttable presumption 
of illegality). 
159.  See generally K-Dur, 686 F.3d 197 (applying per se approach because of concerns 
for weak patents and high costs); Cardizem, 332 F.3d 896 (further affirming per se approach); 
Andrx, 256 F.3d 799 (applying per se approach).  
160.  See Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (discussing future concerns 
regarding pharmaceutical innovation and generic reinvestment). 
161.  See id. (explaining negative results derived from trying to end reverse payment 
settlements). 
162.  See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 125 (asserting concern for presumption of 
illegality putting burden on these settlements); see also Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, 
supra note 5 (asserting strong need for reverse payment settlements to ensure continuing 
innovation and sustainability of generic companies). 
163.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217 (discussing Congress’s intent to protect consumers 
from monopolistic activity).  The court agreed with Congress that litigation is necessary to 
protect consumers from this unjustified monopolistic activity.  See id. (explaining Congress’s 
intent); see also Liu & McNeill, supra note 47, at 16 (explaining that opponents cite rising 
cost of prescription drugs as policy concern).  “Opponents cite the ever-rising cost of 
prescription drugs as another important policy reason for banning the pay-for-delay practice.”  
Id.  
164.  See Dolin, supra note 7, at 286–87 (explaining objectives sought to be 
accomplished through legislation of Act).  “First, the Act sought to bring lower-cost generic 
equivalents of patented drugs to market on an expedited basis and thus make these drugs more 
widely available to the general public.”  Id. at 286; see also Bagherian, supra note 29, at 152 
(asserting that objective of Act is to make more low-cost drugs available on market).  
Congress passed this act with the hope that there would be an increase in expenditures for 
research and development to bring generic alternatives to the market.  See id. (explaining 
incentives meant to be created). 
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pharmaceutical market.165  By offering an expedited procedural process to 
generic manufacturers, the legislature assumed more generic alternatives would 
flood the market and result in a higher volume of consumer options.166  The 
mechanics of the Act have not produced the intended effect.167  These faulty 
mechanics have developed a scenario in which a reverse payment settlement 
offers the greatest net utility to the parties involved.168  In response, some 
courts have tried to vigorously inhibit the availability of this settlement 
structure.169 
The circuit courts employing this per se analysis attempt to force 
monopolistic activity out of the pharmaceutical marketplace by pushing Hatch-
Waxman disputes to litigation.170  The FTC and other opponents of reverse 
payments see judicial activism as the answer to the misguided Act.171  By 
coupling a push for more litigation with the FTC’s analysis showing a high 
success rate in patent challenges, the proponents of a per se approach likely 
 
165.  See Dolin, supra note 7, at 286–87 (discussing intention to make generic 
alternative more widely available).  Congress intended to increase the availability of other 
options in the pharmaceutical market, which would in turn lead to lower prices for consumers.  
See id. (explaining desired result).  
166.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 204 (explaining Congress’s intent in enacting Hatch-
Waxman Act); see also H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14–15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647–48 (discussing intent to make more low-cost generic drugs 
available); Backus, supra note 29, at 380 (explaining Hatch-Waxman Act’s intent to bring 
cheaper copies to market).  
167.  See Hemphill, supra note 9, at 1553–54 (discussing pay-for-delay settlements that 
have resulted from Hatch-Waxman disputes).  “Over the past decade, drug makers have 
settled patent litigation by making large payments to potential rivals who, in turn, abandon 
suits that, if successful, would increase competition.”  Id. at 1553.  “[C]ertain features of the 
Act widen, often by subtle means, the potential for anticompetitive harm from pay-for-delay 
settlements.”  Id.  
168.  See Buter & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 97–98 (discussing high cost of litigation 
lending itself to settlement).  Any anti-competitive effects are offset by a net societal gain 
experienced through avoiding lengthy and expensive litigation.  See id. at 97 (asserting 
benefits of these settlements).  Aside from cost-saving benefits for parties involved, courts and 
society experience gains from settlement as well.  See id. (explaining benefits to multiple 
parties). 
169.  See generally In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(reaffirming approach taken in Andrx); Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 
799 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding reverse payment settlements essentially per se illegal); see also 
Alyssa L. Brown, Modest Proposals for a Complex Problem: Patent Misuse and Incremental 
Changes to the Hatch-Waxman Act as Solutions to the Problem of Reverse Payment 
Settlements, 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 583, 595–96 (discussing Sixth Circuit’s initial response 
making reverse payment settlements per se illegal). 
170.  See generally Cardizem, 332 F.3d 896 (reaffirming approach taken in Andrx); 
Andrx, 256 F.3d 799 (holding reverse payment settlements essentially per se illegal); see also 
Dolin, supra note 7, at 286–87 (asserting that objective of Act is more litigation).  “Finally, 
the Act, through encouraging litigation over the patents that covered these drugs, sought to 
clear the landscape of invalid patents by providing a ‘bounty’ to generics firms that challenged 
the validity or enforceability of the patents covering brand-name drugs.”  Id. at 286–87. 
171.  See K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 206–07 (discussing FTC action relating to K-Dur case).  
The FTC unanimously overruled the Administrative Law Judge’s ruling that the agreements 
were not simply an attempt to preserve monopoly power in the market.  See id. at 207 
(explaining FTC action clearly showing strong restraint to reverse payment settlements). 
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believe their goals for the Hatch-Waxman Act can now be realized.172 
While this line of attack may result in more litigation, an alleged increase 
in generic alternatives, and initially lower consumer costs; severe consequences 
will likely arise in the pharmaceutical industry.173  By increasing litigation and, 
in turn, possibly decreasing patent effectiveness, this per se approach will be 
detrimental to pharmaceutical innovation.174  Without the certainty provided to 
intellectual property through patent law, pharmaceutical companies will find 
little economic incentive to continue the expensive research and development 
needed to generate new medications.175 
When surveying the effects of this per se approach, courts need to evaluate 
the general welfare of society.176  Although consumer costs will possibly 
decrease in the interim, the general welfare of society will be negatively 
affected over time.177  When analyzing the situation, decision-makers should 
consider the importance of continued medical innovation and the successes of 
new drug development in combating illness.178 
 
172.  See Dolin, supra note 7, at 286–87 (discussing objective pushing for more 
litigation relating to pharmaceutical patents); cf. GENERIC DRUG ENTRY, supra note 106, at 
viii (explaining high statistical success rate for challenges that move forward to litigation). 
173.  See Hemphill, supra note 9, at 1562–63 (discussing relationship between 
innovation and patent policy).  Pharmaceutical companies rely heavily on patent protection to 
ensure there will be a financial benefit to drug development.  See id. (asserting patent 
necessity).  “Drug companies, compared to innovators in other industries, cannot as easily rely 
upon a head start, complementary assets, and scale of production as means to preserve 
profits.”  Id. at 1563. 
174.  See id. (discussing relationship between patent protection and innovation).  
“Partly as a result, pharmaceuticals have been associated with the case for strong patents.”  Id. 
at 1564; see also Mark R. Patterson, Leveraging Information About Patents: Settlements, 
Portfolios, and Holdups, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 483 (2012) (explaining recent scholarship bringing 
much uncertainty to patent property rights).  Uncertainty plays an important role in decision 
revolving around patent rights.  See id. at 487–95 (discussing uncertainty and patent rights). 
175.  See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 90 (discussing relationship between patent 
value and future innovation).  The brand name pharmaceuticals are able to use reverse 
payment settlements to add value to their patent rights and therefore, they are able to invest in 
further innovative projects.  See id. (asserting strong reasoning for allowing branded 
pharmaceutical companies to strengthen patent rights). 
176.  See id. at 97–98 (asserting important role settlements play in promoting general 
welfare).  A net societal gain outweighs anticompetitive results that may be a by-product of 
the settlement.  See id. at 97 (asserting benefits of these settlements).  Courts and society in 
general experience gains from settlement as well.  See id. (explaining benefit to multiple 
parties); see also id. at 98 (discussing liquidity cash positions of generic and branded 
pharmaceutical companies).  Some generic companies are small and have very limited cash, 
which results in an undesirable effect from litigation.  See id. (describing how forcing 
litigation may hurt generic manufacturers). 
177.  See Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (explaining how innovation 
that is much needed will likely be negatively effected if reverse payment settlements are 
banned); see also Frank R. Lichtenberg, Pharmaceutical Innovation and Longevity Growth in 
30 Developing and High-Income Countries, 2000-2009 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper Series No. 18235, 2012), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18235.pdf?new_window=1 (explaining direct correlation 
between pharmaceutical innovative and life expectancy). 
178.  See Lichtenberg, supra note 177, at 2 (asserting drug innovation being driving 
force in benefiting human life).  “Life expectancy at all ages and survival rates above age 25 
increased faster in countries with larger increases in drug vintage.”  Id.  
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Moreover, courts should consider the liquidity of generic manufacturers, 
which is scarcely contemplated when analyzing the effects of reverse payment 
settlements.179  Courts may believe that by prohibiting these settlements more 
generic alternatives will enter the market, but the effectual results will likely be 
quite contrary.180  A chilling effect could result if litigation is the only option 
available for generic challengers.181  Due to a lack of financial reserves, along 
with the high cost of litigation, generic companies will likely have to risk 
everything in pursuit of obtaining FDA approval through a Hatch-Waxman 
challenge.182 
Considering long-term consumer welfare, the innovative response likely to 
result, and the high costs of litigation, a per se approach will be injurious to the 
entire pharmaceutical industry.183  Furthermore, the per se approach will 
undermine the courts’ preference for settlement.184  By highlighting the 
problems with this method of analysis, it should be clear that another solution 
must be established.185 
2. Settling Innovation Concerns Through Reverse Payment Settlements 
A strong concern for consumer costs leads many to view the high profit 
margins in the pharmaceutical industry as a problem that must be addressed.186  
It is often overlooked, however, that those high profit margins continue to drive 
 
179.  See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 98 (explaining liquidity cash position of 
generic companies).  Forcing the high costs of litigation on generic challengers could lead to 
other indirect and undesired results.  See id. (asserting opposing viewpoint to effects litigation 
will have on generic challenges and entry into market).   
180.  See id. (asserting likely precompetitive results of allowing reverse payments).  “A 
prohibition on reverse payments in such situations would stifle generic entry.”  Id.  
181.  See Kevin E. Noonan, Generic Defendant Petitions for Certiorari in K-Dur 
Litigation, PATENT DOCS: BIOTECH & PHARMA PATENT LAW & NEWS BLOG (Sept. 18, 
2012), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/generic-defendant-petitions-for-certiora-71606/ 
(asserting that generic defendant believes generic challenges will be chilled by this approach).  
The uncertainty produced by this recent Third Circuit decision will result in a chilling effect 
for generic challenges under the Hatch-Waxman Act.  See id. (explaining how challenges will 
be chilled as result). 
182.  See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 97–99 (discussing high costs of litigation 
and weak cash positions for generic companies); see also Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, 
supra note 5 (explaining change in economic positioning through pharmaceutical marketplace 
that will result from banning reverse payment settlement).  
183.  See Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (asserting how banning reverse 
payment settlements would be injurious to healthcare discovery at all levels).  If litigation 
becomes the only option, generic companies will have less opportunity to challenge patents 
and pharmaceutical companies will be forced to expense large amounts to keep patent rights.  
See id. (explaining negative effects to all involved).  
184.  See Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 402 F.3d 1056, 1072 (11th 
Cir. 2005) (asserting judicial policy concerns for favoring settlements).  The general policy in 
law is to favor settlements to resolve litigation and this is true in patent infringement as well.  
See id. (asserting preference for settlement as point courts must address). 
185.  See Dolin, supra note 7, at 318 (explaining need for better resolution to this 
debate).  “This lack of agreement in academia, Congress, the courts, and the Executive Branch 
leads me to conclude that a new approach is needed . . . .”  Id.  
186.  See PAY-FOR-DELAY, supra note 26, at 4 (asserting strong concern for consumer 
costs portrayed through statistical data collected). 
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pharmaceutical innovation.187  With this critical realization in mind, courts 
should analyze reverse payment settlements using a method that enables the 
pharmaceutical industry to maintain the level of security offered through 
exclusionary patent rights.188 
Reverse payment analysis, prior to the K-Dur decision, migrated towards 
the scope of the patent test, which allowed courts to consider the exclusionary 
rights afforded to a patent holder.189  This test, or some correlative substitute, 
would likely result in the most effective, long-term results.190  The analysis 
should respect the level of exclusion provided by patent law, and courts should 
allow mutual settlements that reinforce patent strength.191  Although costs may 
not decrease, branded pharmaceutical manufacturers will be offered the 
reassurance needed to move forward with new drug research and 
development.192  By implementing a scope of the patent examination, courts 
will ensure general welfare continues to increase through new drug innovation 
and consequently a generic chilling effect will be avoided.193 
First, when addressing the general welfare of society, courts must reflect on 
the increased utility experienced due to the development of new 
medications.194  The medical field has experienced numerous advancements 
 
187.  See Lichtenberg, supra note 177, at 2 (explaining high rate of increase in 
longevity of human life).  Following an economic study, the only variable found to strongly 
correlate with an increase in life expectancy was drug vintage.  See id. (asserting importance 
of new drug innovation).  Drug innovation accounted for almost seventy-five percent of the 
increase in life expectancy throughout the studied countries.  See id. (explaining strong 
statistical data supporting need for future drug innovation). 
188.  See Hemphill, supra note 9, at 1562–63 (asserting heavy reliance pharmaceutical 
companies have on patent policy).  “Almost uniquely, in this industry a patent is considered 
necessary to recoup an initial investment.”  Id. at 1562. 
189.  See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008) (affirming scope of patent test as current approach); In re Tamoxifen Citrate 
Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 213 (2d Cir. 2006) (asserting analysis to be whether agreement 
went beyond scope of patent protection; Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 
1294, 1311 (11th Cir. 2003) (applying scope of patent test). 
190.  See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 120 (asserting rule of reason analysis as 
best approach).  Other analyses, like the per se approach, abbreviate the examination and do 
not fully address the issue.  See id. (explaining other approaches have errors that deem them 
intimately ineffective). 
191.  See Alison Frankel, 3rd Circuit Shocker: Pay-for-Delay Drug Settlements Are 
Illegal, THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (July 16, 2012), 
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2012/07_-
_July/3rd_Circuit_shocker__Pay-for-delay_drug_settlements_are_illegal/ (asserting Judge 
Richard Posner’s reasons to enforce patent protection).  Patent strength and protection is 
needed for pharmaceutical companies to recoup their investments in drug innovation.  See id. 
(explaining importance of patent protections). 
192.  See PAY-FOR-DELAY, supra note 26, at 8 (discussing consumer cost differences 
between branded drugs and generic alternatives).  But see Lichtenberg, supra note 177, at 2 
(explaining major benefits to drug innovation and need to keep innovation driving forward). 
193.  See Lichtenberg, supra note 177, at 2 (explaining clear benefits seen by humanity 
in regards to life expectancy and its relation to pharmaceutical innovation); see also Noonan, 
supra note 181 (asserting concerns from generic companies regarding likely chilling response 
to denying reverse payment settlements). 
194.  See Lichtenberg, supra note 177, at 3 (discussing study regarding life 
expectancy).  In the thirty countries studied, pharmaceutical innovation accounted for three-
fourths of the increase to life expectancy.  See id. at 2. (demonstrating major importance of 
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directly resulting from costly pharmaceutical innovation.195  By allowing 
parties to settle Hatch-Waxman disputes through reverse payment agreements, 
courts will advance a judicial preference for settlement and ensure innovation 
for the future.196 
The harsh reality faced in the pharmaceutical industry is that without the 
certainty provided through patent protection, manufacturers will have little 
incentive to invest in future advancement.197  The high cost of new drug 
development presents a serious risk that must be provided an equivalent reward 
when successful.198  A scope of the patent analysis provides for further patent 
protection, while still examining the legality of the settlement.199  In analyzing 
the restraint placed on trade, the scope of the patent test ensures that the reverse 
payment settlement does not reach beyond patent law protection.200  Through 
this approach, incentives remain in place that provide the certainty necessary for 
branded manufacturers to further pursue the development of new and better 
drugs.201  Furthermore, allowing settlement to preclude litigation in Hatch-
Waxman disputes will have positive effects on generic production as well.202 
 
continuing pharmaceutical innovation). 
195.  See id. (explaining direct correlation between life expectancy advancement and 
pharmaceutical innovation); see also Frankel, supra note 191 (asserting Judge Richard 
Posner’s position on patent protection).  “He gave three reasons why drug companies need 
patent protection: New drugs cost millions of dollars to develop . . . .”  Id. at 1. 
196.  See Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 402 F.3d 1056, 1072 (11th 
Cir. 2005) (asserting judicial policy in favor of settlement); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva 
Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003) (discussing reasonable protections 
afforded through patent protection that should be respected).  
197.  See Frankel, supra note 191 (asserting reasons why pharmaceutical companies 
need strong patent protection); see also Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 
(discussing negative effects on future innovation that would be seen if reverse payment 
settlements were disallowed).   
198.  See Frankel, supra note 191 (explaining Judge Posner’s support for strong patent 
protection).  The three main reasons pharmaceutical innovation needs strong patent protection 
are the millions of dollars in costs, the inability to collect during the entire life span of the 
patent, and the low costs of copying a drug once it is developed.  See id. (asserting Judge 
Posner’s strongly supported argument for patent protection). 
199.  See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 114 (explaining traditional approach 
allowing for contextualized analysis of reverse payment settlements).  This will allow courts 
to learn to differentiate between procompetitive agreements that should be allowed and 
anticompetitive agreements, which should not.  See id. (asserting functionalism of this 
approach). 
200.  See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008) (holding that inquiry is whether restriction goes beyond exclusionary scope of 
patent); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 213 (2d Cir. 2006) (concluding 
that there is no injury to market as long as competition is restrained within scope of patent); 
Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1311–12 (11th Cir. 2003) (asserting 
that correct determination was whether settlements effects went beyond scope of protections 
offered through patent law).  
201.  See Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (explaining that 
pharmaceutical companies need protection of patents and reverse payments to ensure future 
pharmaceutical innovation).  Reverse payment settlements allow for certainty in patent 
protection, which will result in continued innovation.  See id. (asserting importance of 
allowing reverse payment settlements). 
202.  See Noonan, supra note 181 (asserting caution from generic companies because of 
possible chilling effect that would result from banning reverse payment settlements); see also 
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Turning to generic producers, courts have largely failed to address the 
possibility of a chilling effect.203  A per se approach to examining reverse 
payments may hamper the incentive for generic manufacturers to even pursue 
Hatch-Waxman challenges.204  By eliminating the option to agree to a 
structured reverse payment settlement, courts attempt to increase the likelihood 
of future litigation.205  Although this may be an objective of the Act, the high 
expenses incurred through litigation could nearly bankrupt a smaller generic 
manufacturer.206  By eliminating the option to settle the dispute through a 
reverse payment, courts will force generic manufacturers to essentially risk 
everything in pursuit of FDA approval through Hatch-Waxman litigation.207 
Alternately, by allowing reverse payment settlements, generic 
manufacturers are provided financial gain that can later be reinvested into future 
drug development.208  The scope of the patent test allows both the branded 
pharmaceutical companies and the generic manufacturers to mutually achieve 
the greatest level of utility through settlement, while still ensuring the restraints 
placed on trade do not exceed the exclusionary patent rights.209  This 
 
Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (explaining how reverse payment settlements 
provide for future generic entry into market). 
203.  See Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (discussing chilling effect 
likely to be experienced by generic manufacturers).  With the high cost of litigation, generic 
manufactures will likely bring less Hatch-Waxman challenges if reverse payment settlement is 
not an option.  See id. (asserting concern for generic entry as well). 
204.  See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012) (asserting 
reverse payment as prima facie evidence of illegality, therefore ruling reverse payment 
settlements per se illegal); cf. Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (explaining that 
without option of settlements with reverse payment, risk of bringing Hatch-Waxman 
challenges increases and incentive to file ANDA decreases). 
205.  See Dolin, supra note 7, at 286–87 (explaining one objective of Act to be more 
litigation).  The Hatch-Waxman Act was passed in order to encourage more litigation by 
providing incentives to generic challengers.  See id. (asserting original objectives of Act). 
206.  See Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (examining negative effects 
that banning reverse payments would have on generic manufacturers’ availability to bring 
Hatch-Waxman challenges); see also Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 98 (explaining 
difficult position generic manufacturers with poor cash positions would be put in if reverse 
payment settlements were not available). 
207.  See Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 
(N.D. Ill. 2003), dismissed, 104 F. App’x 178 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining how banning 
settlements would reduce generic manufacturers’ option to settle and result in less incentive to 
bring challenges); cf. Hemphill, supra note 9, at 1575 (explaining that assertion made by 
Judge Posner has become relevant in other courts when discussing incentive effects resulting 
from disallowing reverse payment settlements). 
208.  See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 98 (discussing cash positions of both parties 
involved).  The generic company often times has less liquidity and the settlements provide the 
generic manufacturers with money they need to stay afloat, and also to ensure they can 
continue to put drugs into the market.  See id. (explaining why reverse payment settlements 
help generic manufacturers). 
209.  See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1311–12 (11th Cir. 
2003) (discussing scope of patent test).  The court suggests that only the portions of the 
agreement that reached beyond the protections offered by the patent were to be subjected to 
antitrust analysis.  See id. (explaining what triggers antitrust analysis for reverse payment 
settlements); cf. Hemphill, supra note 9, at 1574–75 (explaining that allowing reverse 
payment settlements to continue benefits both parties involved). 
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conclusion will lead to the most effective and beneficial outcome for society.210 
VI. A CONCLUSION OF SUPREME COURT INTERVENTION 
If the Supreme Court affirms this per se approach as the precedent for 
analyzing reverse payment settlements, our pharmaceutical industry will 
experience detrimental consequences.211  The conflict among circuit courts has 
come full circle with the decision in K-Dur.212  After analyzing the 
contradictory policy concerns advanced by opposing circuit courts, the need for 
Supreme Court intervention has become clear.213 
In order to appropriately consider all the implications of a judicial 
resolution, it is imperative that the long-term results are addressed.214  By 
allowing reverse payment settlements to serve as a proper resolution to Hatch-
Waxman Act disputes, the Court will ensure future development in the 
pharmaceutical industry.215  After considering innovative incentives, the 
general welfare of society, and rights afforded through our essential patent 
system, the proper conclusion becomes evident.216  There is a significant need 
 
210.  See Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (asserting concern for banning 
reverse payment settlements).  If courts ban reverse payment settlements through a per se 
approach, not only will innovation for branded pharmaceuticals be affected, but generic 
alternatives will likely be negatively affected because such a ban will result in less challenges 
and a weak position for generic manufacturers.  See id. (explaining in detail issues with 
banning reverse payment settlements). 
211.  See id. (discussing harmful effects on all parties if reverse payment settlements 
are banned).  The branded pharmaceuticals will refrain from further innovation, while the 
generic companies will be forced to face lengthy and expensive litigation in order to pursue a 
Hatch-Waxman challenge.  See id. (describing concerns about banning reverse payment 
settlements). 
212.  See generally In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(concerning claims brought against settling parties to Hatch-Waxman disputes). 
213.  See id. at 210–14 (analyzing most recent reverse payment settlement under 
scrutiny); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (holding patent to be presumptively valid when analyzing reverse payment settlements); 
In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 194 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming scope of 
patent test for analyzing reverse payment settlements); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 
332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003) (concerning same reverse payment settlement in Andrx); Valley 
Drug, 344 F.3d 1294 (turning analysis of reverse payment settlements away from per se 
approach); Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(discussing first relevant reverse payment agreement). 
214.  See Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (discussing detrimental long 
term effects of banning reverse payment settlements).  There is a strong concern for both 
pharmaceutical innovation and future generic challengers when considering a ban of reverse 
payment settlements.  See id. (explaining need to refrain from ban). 
215.  See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 6, at 90 (asserting that reverse payment 
settlements directly affect incentives to innovate).  Reverse payment settlements extend patent 
benefits; therefore, pharmaceutical innovators have more incentive to continue investing in 
new drug development.  See id. (explaining direct economic relationship); see also Reverse-
Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (condemning idea of banning these valuable reverse 
payment settlements). 
216.  See Reverse-Payments Ban Dropped, supra note 5 (expressing strong belief in 
allowing reverse payment settlements).  A ban on reverse payment settlements, which the per 
se approach essentially casts, would be harmful to the future of our entire pharmaceutical 
industry.  See id. (asserting strong concern with moving in this direction). 
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for resolution, and that resolution is to substantiate the scope of the patent test 
as the clear and absolute precedent for analyzing pay-for-delay settlements.217 
 
217.  See Ry Ellison, Reverse Payment Settlement Agreements Likely Headed for 
Supreme Court Showdown, WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION (July 23, 2012), 
http://wlflegalpulse.com/2012/07/23/reverse-payment-settlement-agreements-likely-headed-
for-supreme-court-showdown/ (discussing likelihood that Third Circuit’s K-Dur decision 
could result in Supreme Court resolution).  The Supreme Court is faced with a decision to 
choose between the views of the Third Circuit and the more reasoned and free-market 
approach of the other three circuits.  See id. (expressing decision to be made).  
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